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1277 
FOSTER CARE AND THE “SIGNIFICANT RISK” 
OF AIDS: APPLYING THE DIRECT THREAT 
EXCEPTION TO THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT AND THE REHABILITATION 
ACT IN DOE V. COUNTY OF CENTRE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
1
 offers federal 
protection for disabled persons.
2
 Patterned after the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 (Rehabilitation Act),
3
 the ADA combats discrimination based on a 
person’s disabilities.4 However, under the direct threat exception to Title II of 
the ADA
5
 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
6
 discrimination against 
 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1999 & Supp. V 1999). According to Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). A 
disability is defined, in part, as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). 
 2. GERALD J. STINE, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: BIOLOGICAL, MEDICAL, 
SOCIAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 455 (2d ed. 1996). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
prohibits disability discrimination in federal programs. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 705(9)(B) (Supp. V 1999) (using a definition of disability that is nearly identical to that of the ADA). 
According to the Supreme Court, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act have complementary statutory 
meanings. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (“[T]he ADA must be construed to be 
consistent with regulations issued to implement the Rehabilitation Act.”). See also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12201(a) (1994) (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.”); 
28 C.F.R. § 36.103(a) (2001). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities . . . .”). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against “otherwise 
qualified individual[s] with a disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. V 1999).  
 5. 49 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994). According to the direct threat exception to the ADA,  
[n]othing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or 
benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such 
entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The term “direct 
threat” means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a 
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services. 
Id.  
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D) (Supp. V 1999). According to the direct threat exception to the 
Rehabilitation Act, the Rehabilitation Act does not apply to 
an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such 
disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or 
who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of 
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individuals with disabilities is permitted if the disability “poses a direct threat 
to the health or safety of others.”7  
Courts have recognized persons with HIV-positive status as disabled 
persons within the meaning of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
8
 The 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, commonly known as HIV, is generally 
understood to be the cause of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS).
9
 HIV is a retrovirus
10
 that “mutates at an unusually high rate.”11 The 
virus can be transmitted through contaminated blood transfusions,
12
 
intravenous drug use,
13
 and sexual contact.
14
 In addition, neonatal infection
15
 
 
 
the job. 
Id. 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994). See also 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D) (Supp. V 1999). See also 
infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (examining the congressional approach to the direct threat 
exception). 
 8. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-47 (1998) (finding that an asymptomatic 
HIV-positive individual was disabled within the meaning of the ADA). See also infra notes 44-45 and 
accompanying text (discussing the recognition of an asymptomatic HIV-positive status as a disability 
under federal and state law). 
 9. STINE, supra note 2, at 32-33. But see id. at 29-31 (discussing the minority view that HIV 
does not cause AIDS). The public first became aware of AIDS on June 5, 1981, when the “Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) reported that five cases of a rare form of pneumonia . . . had been diagnosed in 
homosexual men . . . . [P]ediatric AIDS, defined as AIDS in children younger than 13 years of age, 
was first described in 1983.” THEODORE J. STEIN, THE SOCIAL WELFARE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
WITH HIV AND AIDS: LEGAL PROTECTIONS, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS 1 (1998). See also infra note 14 
and accompanying text (noting that heterosexual contact accounts for ninety percent of HIV infection 
since 1990).  
 10. “Retroviruses . . . reverse the usual flow of genetic information within the host cell.” STINE, 
supra note 2, at 39. 
 11. Id. at 54.  
 12. “[P]rior to the nationwide implementation of a blood screening test in late 1985, infection via 
transfusion of contaminated blood or blood products . . . accounted for nearly 3% of AIDS cases in the 
United States.” THOMAS E. ANDREOLI ET AL., CECIL ESSENTIALS OF MEDICINE 749-50 (4th ed. 1997). 
Currently, the risk of becoming infected with HIV through blood transfusions in North America and 
Western Europe is “extremely small, but not absent.” Id. at 750. 
 13. “The sharing of needles used for drug injection transmits the virus efficiently and continues 
to be a major mode of spread of [HIV virus] infection in North America and Western Europe.” Id. 
 14. ANDREOLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 749-51. Furthermore,  
[a]lthough AIDS was initially recognized among sexually active homosexual males and 
intravenous drug users in the United States, heterosexual contact has been the dominant mode of 
[HIV virus] transmission throughout most of the world, accounting for more than 90% of 
infections recognized since 1990. . . . The concurrent presence of other sexually transmissible 
diseases (STDs), especially those associated with genital ulcerations, strongly facilitates sexual 
transmission of [the HIV virus].  
Id. at 749. 
 15. “It is estimated that about 20 to 30 percent of infants born to HIV-infected mothers are 
themselves infected with HIV.” Felissa L. Cohen & Wendy M. Nehring, Foster Care of HIV-Positive 
Children in the United States, PUB. HEALTH REP., Jan. 1994, at 60-61. However,  
[b]y 18 months, children normally lose the antibodies acquired from their mothers, and about half 
of them become HIV-negative. . . . The practice, when children turn out healthy, is to move them 
away from the AIDS foster families into permanent homes, making room for more AIDS babies. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/8
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“may occur in utero, during labor, or, less frequently, after birth through 
breast-feeding.”16 Generally, HIV attacks the white blood cells, and the 
disease progresses to AIDS when the white blood cell count reaches a certain 
level.
17
 The disease eventually compromises the immune system.
18
 However, 
HIV-positive individuals “are asymptomatic during most of the course of 
[HIV] infection . . . , and even seriously immunocompromised individuals 
often function productively between bouts of opportunistic infections.”19 
Although there are drug treatments that help decrease the amount of virus in 
an HIV-positive individual, there is no known cure.
20
 
In Doe v. County of Centre,
21
 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that according to an individualized evaluation of the 
“significant threat” posed by a household with an HIV-positive child to a 
foster child, such foster care placement would not automatically invoke the 
direct threat exception to the ADA
22
 or the Rehabilitation Act
23
 against 
discrimination based on disabilities.
24
 Therefore, a county policy prohibiting 
the placement of foster children with an infectious disease into households 
that did not have a member with the same infectious disease constituted 
impermissible disability discrimination.
25
 
This Recent Development examines the Third Circuit’s treatment of the 
direct threat exception to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act in Doe v. 
County of Centre. Part II examines the development of the law regarding the 
 
 
Thus what the foster parents risk is loving the children and having to give them away, or keeping 
them to love through a slow death. 
Richard Conniff, Foster Children with the AIDS Virus: Families That Open Their Homes to the Sick, 
TIME, Dec. 5, 1988, at 12. 
 16. ANDREOLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 750. See Cohen & Nehring, supra note 15, at 60 (“HIV 
disease has the potential to become the leading pediatric infectious cause of neurological and 
developmental handicaps, as well as a leading cause of death in children younger than 5 years . . . .”).  
 17. See ANDREOLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 755. “Progression of disease varies greatly among 
individuals and is also related to age at time of infection. Adolescents with HIV progress to AIDS at a 
slower rate than older persons, with fewer than 30% developing AIDS within 10 years after HIV 
infection.” Id. 
 18. “When the [white blood cell] count drops below 200, patients are at high risk of developing 
multiple opportunistic infections.” Id. at 755. Patients with white blood cell counts under 50 have 
severe immunodeficiency and have a “high mortality [rate] within the subsequent 24 to 36 months.” 
Id. at 756. 
 19. Id. 
 20. ANDREOLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 757-58 (describing various treatments for HIV infection). 
Unfortunately, “it is likely . . . that HIV will eventually develop resistence to even the most potent 
antiretroviral regimens.” Id. at 758. See also STINE, supra note 2, at 259. 
 21. 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Doe III]. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12182(b)(3) (1994). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D) (Supp. V 1999). 
 24. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 448-52. 
 25. Id. at 444-45, 448-52. 
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direct threat exception to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as the 
development of the law regarding HIV/AIDS in the context of the foster care 
system. Part III analyzes the Third Circuit’s disposition in Doe v. County of 
Centre. Part IV concludes that the Third Circuit’s decision furthers the 
judicial trend to recognize the HIV/AIDS condition as a disability under the 
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and apply the direct threat exception to 
those statutes for the purpose of combating “society’s accumulated myths 
and fears”26 about HIV/AIDS transmission. In addition, this Recent 
Development emphasizes the importance of individualized inquiries with 
regard to the direct threat exception in the context of foster care and 
HIV/AIDS. The threat of an incurable disease necessitates such 
individualized inquiries to balance the State’s interest in the protection of 
foster children, the interest of disabled individuals in freedom from disability 
discrimination, and societal interest in its own public welfare.  
II. HISTORY 
A. Development of the Law Regarding the Direct Threat Exception to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973  
1. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court reconciled the competing 
interests of protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination and 
protecting the public from health and safety risks. In School Board of Nassau 
County v. Arline,
27
 an elementary school teacher with a history of 
tuberculosis claimed that she had been wrongfully terminated because she 
was disabled under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
28
 Aware of irrational 
societal fears and biases regarding persons with disabilities, the Court chose 
not to interpret the Rehabilitation Act to permit overbroad discrimination 
against persons with contagious disabilities.
29
 Instead, the Court determined 
 
 
 26. 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
 27. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).  
 28. Id. at 284-85. 
 29. Id. at 286 (noting that “the fact that a person with a record of a physical impairment is also 
contagious does not suffice to remove that person from coverage under § 504 [of the Rehabilitation 
Act]”). 
Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment would be 
inconsistent with the basic purpose of § 504, which is to ensure that handicapped individuals are 
not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others. By 
amending the definition of “handicapped individual” to include not only those who are actually 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/8
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that “only those individuals who are both handicapped and otherwise 
qualified are eligible for relief.”30 
The Court established a four-part test for courts to consider when making 
factual findings for the “significant risk” standard.31 First, courts should 
make findings regarding the nature of the risk, as presented by the 
transmission of the disease.
32
 Second, courts should find the duration of the 
risk by measuring the carrier’s infectious period.33 Third, courts should 
determine the severity of the risk to third parties.
34
 Fourth, courts should 
examine the probability that the disease will be transmitted from the carrier 
and cause “varying degrees of harm.”35 After reaching the conclusion that the 
respondent was a disabled person under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court 
remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether she was 
otherwise qualified to retain her position as an elementary school teacher.
36
  
2. Congressional Approach to the Direct Threat Exception 
In approval of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Rehabilitation 
Act, which permitted employers to refuse to hire a person who posed “a 
significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others,”37 Congress 
amended the statute to include the Court’s construction.38 A few years later, 
 
 
physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are 
substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society’s accumulated 
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations 
that flow from actual impairment.  
Id. at 284. 
 30. Arline, 480 U.S. at 285. See also id. at 286 n.15 (“[C]ourts may reasonably be expected 
normally to defer to the judgments of public health officials in determining whether an individual is 
otherwise qualified unless those judgments are medically unsupportable.”). 
 31. Id. at 287 n.16 (“A person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious 
disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable 
accommodation will not eliminate that risk.”).  
 32. Id. at 288.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289. On remand, the district court applied the factors suggested by the 
Supreme Court and found that “the decision to terminate Plaintiff because of her history of 
tuberculosis was not based on reasonable medical judgments, but rather, was based upon ‘society’s 
accumulated myths and fears about [tuberculosis].’” Arline v. Sch. Bd. Of Nassau County, 692 F. 
Supp. 1286, 1291-92 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 
(1987)). The district court found that the “[p]laintiff posed no threat of communicating tuberculosis to 
the schoolchildren she was teaching” and was therefore entitled to damages. 692 F. Supp. at 1292. 
 37. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16. 
 38. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998). See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (1994). See also 
supra note 6 and accompanying text (direct threat exception to the Rehabilitation Act). 
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Congress codified the Arline rationale in the ADA.
39
 
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act represent legislative efforts to offer 
federal protection to disabled persons through prohibitions against disability 
discrimination. However, Congress was concerned that ill-founded claims 
based on generalizations and speculations would lead to the over-invocation 
of the direct threat exception, thereby leaving an unguarded loophole that 
would allow disability discrimination.
40
 Sensitive to the possibility of such 
blind and automatic decisions, Congress was careful to emphasize the 
importance of making decisions based on individualized determinations.
41
 In 
addition, for an invocation of the direct threat exception to be successful, an 
individualized inquiry must reveal that the risk, if it does exist, is indeed 
significant.
42
 
3. Bragdon v. Abbott 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the ADA’s direct threat 
exception in Bragdon v. Abbott,
43
 a case in which a dentist refused to treat an 
HIV-positive patient. Despite the fact that the patient was asymptomatic,
44
 
 
 
 39. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 649. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994) (direct threat 
exception to the ADA). 
 40. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 45 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 468. 
 41. “The purpose of creating the ‘direct threat’ standard is to eliminate exclusions which are not 
based on objective evidence about the individual involved.” Id. There are a number of cases noting the 
importance of individualized inquiries about the risk posed by HIV-positive persons. See, e.g., Holiday 
v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the lower court should not 
have relied on evidence that was not based on an “individualized inquiry [as] mandated by the ADA”); 
Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. 
Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1998). Compare Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), with 
Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001) (utilizing an individualized inquiry to determine 
whether the direct threat exception applies). 
 42. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (“Because few, if any, activities in life are 
risk free, Arline and the ADA do not ask whether a risk exists, but whether it is significant.”). See also 
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994); Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16 (“A person who poses a significant risk 
of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for 
his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk.”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), 
at 46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 469 (“The plaintiff is not required to prove that he 
or she poses no risk.”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
338 (stating that a “significant risk” must be more than a “speculative or remote risk”). 
 43. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 44. A significant number of courts have accepted the idea that “asymptomatic HIV infection 
satisfie[s] the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of a handicap.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 644. See 
Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1457 (11th Cir. 1990); Ray v. Sch. Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1533, 
1536 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 380-81 (C.D. Cal. 
1987); Dist. 27 Cmty. Sch. Bd. v. Bd. of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335-37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). Other 
courts have not drawn a distinction between asymptomatic and symptomatic status when determining 
whether or not the definition of disability is met. See Martinez v. Sch. Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th 
Cir. 1988); Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. Of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/8
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the Court considered the patient’s HIV status a disability under the ADA 
because her “HIV infection [was] a physical impairment which substantially 
limit[ed] a major life activity.”45  
After a “rigorous and individualized inquiry into the risk of HIV 
transmission from patient to dentist,”46 the Court questioned the credibility of 
studies addressing the transmission of the AIDS virus, and remanded the case 
to “permit a full exploration of the issue.”47 Relying on its earlier disposition 
in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
48
 the Court noted the 
importance of ascertaining the significance of the risk, rather than addressing 
whether a risk existed.
49
 Noting that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
applied an objective standard in the case below, the Court expressed its 
concern that the First Circuit “might have placed mistaken reliance upon two 
. . . sources.”50 The insufficiency of the evidence persuaded the Court to 
 
 
Doe v. Dolton Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Robertson v. 
Granite City Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9, 684 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-07 (S.D. Ill. 1988); Local 1812, 
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. United States Dept. of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987). 
The Justice Department has added both asymptomatic and symptomatic HIV infection to the list of 
disorders constituting a physical impairment. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii) (2001). See also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE III TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE MANUAL § III-2.2000 at 9 (Nov. 1993). 
 45. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 641. The Court accepted the assertion of the Office of Legal 
Counsel of the Department of Justice (OLC) that “the life activity of procreation . . . is substantially 
limited for an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual.” Id. at 643 (citing Application of Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals, 12 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 209, 216 (1988)). 
Congress accepted this assertion, as well as others made by the OLC. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 52 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) (defining a 
disability as “a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more of [an individual’s] major 
life activities”). The Court noted that “HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with 
a constant and detrimental effect on the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems from the 
moment of infection,” but it declined to determine “whether HIV infection is a per se disability under 
the ADA.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 637, 642. The Court was not able to rely on the 
Rehabilitation Act regulations for guidance. Id. at 639 (citing 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 334 (1997)). 
See generally Emily J. Carton, Comment, Lethal but Not Disabled?—The Circuits Split on ADA 
Coverage of the Asymptomatic HIV-Positive Victim, 103 DICK. L. REV. 129 (1998) (addressing the 
debate over whether an asymptomatic HIV-positive person is disabled under the ADA); Lawrence O. 
Gostin et al., Disability Discrimination in America: HIV/AIDS and Other Health Conditions, 281 
JAMA 745 (1999); David W. Webber & Lawrence O. Gostin, Discrimination Based on HIV/AIDS and 
Other Health Conditions: “Disability” as Defined Under Federal and State Law, 3 J. HEALTH CARE 
L. & POL’Y 266 (2000) (examining the recognition of HIV/AIDS status as a disability under federal 
and state law). 
 46. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 437, 448 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
 47. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 655. 
 48. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).  
 49. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 649. 
 50. Id. at 651. The Court disagreed with the First Circuit’s interpretation of the Center for 
Disease Control’s Guidelines, Ctr. For Disease Control, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 
Recommended Infection Control Practices for Dentistry, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.: 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REP., May 28, 1993, at 1, and the 1991 AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION 
POLICY ON HIV (1991), in that the First Circuit read “implicit assumptions” regarding the level of risk 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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remand the case back to the Court of Appeals.
51
 While the Court 
acknowledged the possibility that the First Circuit could reach the same 
conclusion on remand, it emphasized the importance of a thorough inquiry.
52
  
B. Development of the Law Regarding HIV/AIDS in the Context of the 
Foster Care System 
According to various studies, children in foster care account for twenty-
seven to thirty-three percent of “children in families where the mother and/or 
child has HIV.”53 HIV-positive children are often placed in foster care 
because of parental neglect.
54
 Although most states have general foster care 
policies, less than half have foster care policies addressing the needs of 
children with HIV/AIDS.
55
 In addition, commentators have criticized states 
for under-enrolling HIV-infected foster children in research studies that 
could lead to “HIV- and AIDS-related treatments particularized for 
children,”56 and for discriminatory nontreatment of HIV-positive infants.57 
At the same time, there is very little case law regarding HIV/AIDS-
infected persons in the context of foster care. The issue of placing foster 
children—healthy or otherwise—into households with an HIV/AIDS-
infected child is a novel one. To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed 
this issue.  
1. In re Interest of John T. 
In the seminal case of In re Interest of John T., the Nebraska Court of 
 
 
where the Supreme Court found only a “recommendation that the universal precautions are the best 
way to combat the risk of HIV transmission.” 524 U.S. at 651-52. 
 51. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 655.  
 52. See id. (“A remand will permit a full exploration of the issue through the adversary 
process.”).  
 53. STEIN, supra note 9, at 65. See Deborah Weimer, Beyond Parens Patriae: Assuring Timely, 
Informed, Compassionate Decisionmaking for HIV-Positive Children in Foster Care, 46 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 379, 380 (1991) (noting that “[i]n 1990, 42% of children known to be HIV positive were not 
living with their parents; 26% had been placed in foster care, 9% were living with a relative, and 7% 
were living with someone other than a relative”).  
 54. Weimer, supra note 53, at 382. 
 55. Cohen & Nehring, supra note 15, at 62 (noting that 89.1% of the states surveyed had a 
general foster care policy, while only 38.2% of the states indicated that they had “specific foster care 
policies regarding the care of children with HIV-AIDS”). “Not surprisingly, most States developed 
their policies and procedures after a child with HIV was presented for placement in foster care.” Id. at 
65. 
 56. Briar McNutt, The Under-Enrollment of HIV-Infected Foster Children in Clinical Trials and 
Protocols and the Need for Corrective State Action, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 231, 232 (1994). 
 57. Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses and Discrimination: Discriminatory Nontreatment of 
Infants with HIV Infection, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1581 (1993). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/8
   
 
 
 
 
 
2001] FOSTER CARE AND “SIGNIFICANT RISK” OF AIDS 1285 
 
 
 
 
Appeals examined the issue of whether a three and six-month-old child 
should be moved out of his foster home because his foster mother had been 
diagnosed with AIDS.
58
 The court held that the preponderance of the 
evidence showed that it was in the child’s best interests to remain with his 
foster parents.
59
 In reaching its judgment, the court conducted a thorough and 
individualized analysis. The court examined the level of care that John T. 
received from his foster parents and noted that there was “virtually no risk 
that HIV [would] be transmitted to John through ordinary household 
contact.”60   
III. ANALYSIS 
In Doe v. County of Centre,
61
 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit confronted the novel issue of foster child placement in a 
household with an HIV-positive child. John and Mary Doe were an 
interracial couple with a large family of adopted children.
62
 When Mary Doe 
 
 
 58. In re Interest of John T., 538 N.W.2d 761, 762 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995). The Department of 
Social Services also expressed concern that because John T. had a “biological family history of 
schizophrenia . . . such a trauma [of the foster mother’s inevitable death] could accelerate the onset of 
schizophrenia, if he [was] going to be so afflicted.” Id. at 769. However, the court noted that the 
medical expert suggesting this outcome had never met John T. in person. Id. at 770. See Jenny L. 
Plager, Note, Foster Parents and AIDS: Considering the Best Interests of a Foster Child in In re 
Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995), 77 NEB. L. REV. 617, 619 (1998) 
(criticizing the Nebraska Court of Appeals decision for placing the child’s best interests “behind the 
social goal of discouraging discrimination in the judicial process against an individual with AIDS”). 
Notably, John T.’s foster mother died of AIDS seven months after the child was returned to the foster 
home. Butch Mabin, Judge Says Man Can Sue Officials in Adoption Case, LINCOLN J. STAR, Apr. 26, 
1997, at 1C. See generally Pierce J. Reed & Laura Davis Smith, HIV, Judicial Logic and Medical 
Science: Toward a Presumption of Noninfection in Child-Custody and Visitation Cases, 31 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 471, 473 (1997) (providing a “general overview of custody determinations involving parents 
infected with HIV”). 
 59. In re Interest of John T., 538 N.W.2d at 773. But see McNicholas v. Johnson (Matter of 
Adoption of Johnson), 612 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that it was in the child’s best 
interest to allow biological mother to withdraw consent to adoption where both adoptive parents were 
HIV-positive). 
 60. In re Interest of John T., 538 N.W.2d at 769. Although there was no case precedent regarding 
the removal of a foster child due to HIV or AIDS infection of one or more parents, the court accepted 
the persuasive authority from other states that there is “no risk of HIV infection through close personal 
contact or sharing of household functions.” Id. at 771-72 (citing Newton v. Riley, 899 S.W.2d 509, 
510 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Steven L. v. Dawn J., 561 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325) (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) 
(quoting Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988))). See also Stewart v. Stewart, 521 
N.E.2d 956, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that “the medical evidence and studies available at 
the time of trial showed that AIDS is not transmitted through everyday household contact”); Jane W. 
v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (referring to a study that found that “there has 
been no transmission of the AIDS virus within the close contact of familial groupings”). 
 61. 242 F.3d 437 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
 62. Id. at 441. Mary Doe had “dedicated herself to the care of foster children with special needs” 
and eventually adopted seven of her eight foster children. Id. One child “was blind, retarded and had 
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adopted Adam—an infant who had contracted HIV from his birth mother—
the virus developed into AIDS.
63
 As a result, Adam experienced severe 
health problems that forced him to rely on the assistance of others for basic 
functions, including eating and attending to personal hygiene.
64
 Adam 
suffered massive weight loss, exhibited “symptoms of autism and permanent 
learning deficits,” and required the use of a feeding tube for nourishment.65 
In March 1996, doctors implemented a regimen of aggressive drug therapy, 
which suppressed Adam’s viral load66 to such an extent that he regained his 
health and “suffer[ed] no greater risk of opportunistic infection than a child 
without HIV.”67 John and Mary Doe expressed a desire to participate in the 
Office of Children and Youth Services of Centre County (CYS) foster care 
program. They disclosed their son’s HIV-positive status to a CYS employee 
conducting home studies for prospective foster parents.
68
 At the time, the 
CYS did not have a policy regarding foster child placement into a household 
with an HIV-positive member.
69
 The CYS officials investigated Centre 
County foster care records and discovered a “pattern of physical and sexual 
abuse among foster children.”70 Concerned about the possibility that a foster 
 
 
cerebral palsy” and other children had histories of physical and sexual abuse. Id. Mary Doe often 
received recognition for her efforts, including being named Foster Parent of the Year by the New York 
State Foster Parents’ Association. Id. 
 63. Id. at 441. “In 49 States, foster parents could later adopt their foster child with HIV-AIDS.” 
Cohen & Nehring, supra note 15, at 65. 
 64. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 442.  
 65. Id. 
 66. The viral load of an HIV-positive person indicates the level of HIV virus present in the 
person’s blood. Id. at 442 n.2.  
 67. Id. at 442. At Adam’s present health state, he is no more vulnerable to becoming ill from a 
sickness or disease than any other healthy child. However, it should be noted that Adam’s HIV-
positive status remains unchanged. Id. 
 68. See Wendy M. Nehring et al., Disclosing the Diagnosis of Pediatric HIV Infection: Mothers’ 
Views, J. SOC’Y PEDIATRIC NURSES, Jan.-Mar. 2000, at 5 (examining the results of a study identifying 
“to whom biological and foster mothers disclose the diagnosis of [pediatric] HIV infection”). See also 
Plager, supra note 58, at 636-37 (criticizing the Nebraska Court of Appeals’ de-emphasis of the foster 
parents’ “conscious deception” in not disclosing the HIV-positive status of the foster mother to the 
foster care agency). 
 69. See Doe III, 242 F.3d at 443 (“Prior to the Does’ application, CYS officials had never 
knowingly placed a child in a foster home where someone had HIV, and therefore had no policy to 
address the limitations, if any, applying to such a home.”). See also Cohen & Nehring, supra note 15, 
at 65 (“Not surprisingly, most States developed their policies and procedures after a child with HIV 
was presented for placement in foster care.”). 
 70. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 444. CYS officials concluded that “the emergency nature of foster child 
placement . . . [precluded adequate] time to assess each foster child for behavioral or emotional 
problems prior to placement.” Id. See also Circuit Court Addresses Direct Threat Issue, Reverses HIV 
Foster Care Ban, DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULL., Mar. 23, 2001 (stating that the CYS defended the 
policy “[b]ased on data that 12 percent of the county’s foster children have a history of perpetrating 
some form of sexual abuse” and that “roughhousing with a child with HIV could lead to HIV 
infection”).  
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child could contract HIV by sexually assaulting Adam, the CYS director 
formulated a policy prohibiting the placement of a foster child with an 
infectious disease into a home unless a member of the home had the same 
infectious disease.
71
 The Board of Commissioners of Centre County adopted 
this policy, but allowed parents or guardians of the foster child to opt out of 
the policy by their informed consent.
72
 The Does brought a suit against 
Centre County, the CYS, the County Board, and CYS officials, claiming 
violations of various statutes, including the ADA.
73
  
The district court applied the four-factor test from School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline
74
 and concluded that Adam’s HIV-positive status 
posed a significant risk to foster children who might sexually assault him.
75
 
The court’s conclusion was based on general findings of fact regarding the 
nature, duration, and severity of the risk posed by HIV and AIDS to the 
carrier and third parties.
76
 In addition, the court accepted the County’s 
argument that there was a “high probability that [HIV] will be transmitted 
[through sexual contact] to children placed in foster care with the Does.”77  
Under plenary review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
to the County, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held 
that there was a genuine factual dispute regarding the district court’s finding 
that there was a high probability that HIV would be transmitted to foster 
children placed in the Does’ household.78 The Third Circuit assumed that the 
district court’s finding was based in part on the CYS data showing that the 
“CYS foster children have a high propensity to sexually abuse other 
 
 
 71. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 444-45.  
 72. Id. The informed consent on the part of the child’s parent or guardian would necessitate the 
voluntary agreement by “the foster parents . . . to release information to the [foster] child’s parents that 
a member of the foster family ha[d] been diagnosed with a specific serious infectious disease.” Id. at 
445. 
 73. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 445. The Does also argued that the CYS policy violated Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994), and “equal protection guarantees under the United 
States Constitution.” Id. The Does claimed racial discrimination was another reason for their rejection 
by CYS, because a CYS official informed them that race was a factor in foster child placement. Id. 
There were no African-American foster children available for placement at the time, and the CYS 
official explained that CYS “tries to replicate a foster child’s original home environment . . . [because] 
[r]acial continuity minimizes disruption and change in the child’s life.” Id. 
 74. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.  
 75. Doe v. County of Centre, 60 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428-29 (M.D. Pa. 1999) [hereinafter Doe I]. 
 76. Id. The Third Circuit did not contest three of the District Court’s findings regarding: (1) the 
nature of the risk (that “the HIV virus has been proven to be transmitted through sexual intercourse 
(homosexual or heterosexual), intravenous drug use, and transfusion of blood and blood products”); 
(2) the duration of the risk (that “AIDS is a terminal disease for which there is no cure . . . the risk [is] 
present until the carrier succumbs to the disease”); and (3) the severity of the risk (that “[t]he harm to 
third parties is life-threatening”). Id. at 428. See Doe III, 242 F.3d at 449.  
 77. Doe I, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 428. 
 78. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 449.  
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children.”79 Reasoning that an application of the ADA’s direct threat 
exception requires an “individualized inquiry into the significance of the 
threat posed,”80 the court criticized the lower court’s reliance on “a bland and 
generalized set of statistics, lacking in individual specificity.”81 The court 
conducted an individualized analysis of its own, finding that “foster children 
of tender age
82
 . . . are extremely unlikely to commit forcible sexual inter 
course [sic] leading to the transmission of HIV.”83 In addition, given Adam’s 
own tender age and frailty, it was not reasonable to expect that he would be a 
sexual aggressor capable of transmiting HIV to any foster child placed in his 
home.
84
 In essence, the court took issue with the CYS official’s testimony 
that it was impossible to predict which foster children would become sexual 
assaulters.
85
 According to the court’s rationale, children of tender age are a 
category of foster children exempt from identification as potential 
perpetrators of sexual assault.
86
 
The Third Circuit next addressed the district court’s concern that even if 
the risk of transmission during one instance of sexual contact was negligible, 
there was a risk nonetheless, and there was no way to ensure only casual 
contact between Adam and a foster child.
87
 The County argued that “the 
direct threat test in Arline and Bragdon developed in the context of HIV-
positive persons rightfully demand[ed] inclusion into the public sphere and 
into public life.”88 Because the Does were requesting foster care placement 
into their private home, the County argued that the intrusion of the court was 
even more necessary because “the threat posed in a private home is much 
greater.”89 However, the Third Circuit noted that the context of the private 
 
 
 79. Id. See also Doe II, 80 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (M.D. Pa. 2000). 
 80. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 449. 
 81. Id. The Third Circuit noted that although the statistics showed that “12% of the foster 
children have had histories of perpetrating some form of ‘sexual abuse,’ . . . the statistics broadly 
define ‘sexual abuse’ to include activities such as fondling and disrobing that carry no risk of 
transmitting HIV.” Id. See Doe II, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 441. 
 82. “Tender age” is understood to include “infants and children who have not reached puberty.” 
Doe III, 242 F.3d at 449. But see id. at 449 n.7 (noting that “the phrase ‘children of tender years’ has 
varied in social and legal contexts, with little direct connection to sexual development”). 
 83. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 449. 
 84. Id. at 449-50. 
 85. Id. at 449 (citing Doe II, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 442).  
 86. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 449-50. 
 87. Id. at 450-51. See id. at 449 (“[T]he statistics do not indicate how many children can be 
readily identified as being unable or unlikely to engage in high-risk behavior.”); Doe II, 80 F. Supp. 2d 
at 442 (“CYS cannot identify with any certainty at the time of placement which of its foster children 
will engage in assaultive behavior or those children who will be sexual perpetrators”). See also id. at 
443. 
 88. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 451. 
 89. Id. 
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sphere presented monitoring difficulties and “involve[d] more intimate 
contact than would ordinarily take place in the public sphere,” but such 
distinctions from the public sphere did not warrant a blanket policy.
90
 Where 
an individualized risk analysis, as performed in the present case, indicated 
“tender-aged and disabled foster children who, by their inherent physical 
limitations, face negligible risk from an HIV-positive child such as Adam,” 
factors such as lack of monitoring and propensity for intimate contact have 
“no material effect.”91 Therefore, because “a reasonable fact finder could find 
that placement of at least some foster children in the Does’ home would not 
entail a significant risk of harm,”92 the Third Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s decision granting summary judgment against the Does’ claims of 
disability discrimination and remanded the case for further discovery and 
factual findings.
93
 
Doe v. County of Centre is a sound decision. The Third Circuit based its 
rationale on a careful and intelligent application of the Supreme Court 
precedent set by Arline and Bragdon to the novel issue of foster child 
placement in households with an HIV-positive member. Based on the 
determination that not all foster children presented a significant risk, the court 
adopted an individualized inquiry and resisted a blanket policy that would 
discriminate against persons with serious infectious diseases.
94
 After noting 
that the risk of transmission through casual contact is negligible, the court 
reasoned that tender-aged and disabled foster children were unlikely to 
sexually assault Adam
95
 and that Adam himself was in no condition to be the 
perpetrator of a sexual assault.
96
 
In response to the County’s argument that a broad policy is appropriate in 
the context of a devastating and incurable disease such as AIDS,
97
 the court 
noted that some federal appellate courts had applied the ADA direct threat 
 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. The court noted the testimony of a physician that “out of the 21,000 AIDS cases in 
Pennsylvania, there are no reported cases of virus transmission due to familial contact or fighting. 
Even intense physical activities create little risk of infection.” Id. at 442. See supra note 60 (citing 
cases that agree that transmission of AIDS through ordinary household contact is very low). See also 
Doe III, 242 F.3d at 442 (noting that “Adam has not transmitted HIV to his brother, . . . nor to any 
children with whom he attends school”). 
 92. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 441.  
 93. Id. at 458. 
 94. Id. at 451-52. See also infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (describing the Third 
Circuit’s argument against the County’s blanket discriminatory policy). 
 95. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 449-50. See, e.g., id. at 449 (“Foster children of tender age . . . are 
extremely unlikely to commit forcible sexual inter course [sic] leading to the transmission of HIV.”). 
 96. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 449-50.  
 97. See STEIN, supra note 9, at 77-78 (describing the state’s responsibility to children in foster 
care). 
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exception because “any amount of risk through a ‘specific and theoretically 
sound means of transmission’ constitutes a significant risk.”98 However, the 
court also found that other appellate courts required “some actual risk of 
transmission including documented cases.”99 Agreeing with the latter courts, 
the Third Circuit interpreted the direct threat exception narrowly. Given the 
method of transmission of the infectious disease and the nature of the parties 
(i.e., Adam, who as an invalid relied on the assistance of others for basic 
care, and foster children who could potentially be tender-aged and/or 
disabled
100
), the court found that a reasonable fact finder could not find, 
based on the record, “that an individual with HIV would always pose a 
significant risk to a foster child placed by the County in that individual’s 
home.”101 Therefore, although transmission of HIV was theoretically 
 
 
 98. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 450 (citing Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297-99 (11th Cir. 1999), 
which held that HIV-infected prisoners may be segregated from the general inmate population). Other 
courts have held that even a remote chance of transmission may be sufficient to justify discrimination 
based on HIV infection. See Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 405, 407 (6th Cir. 
1998) (upholding judgment against HIV-positive surgical technician despite a 1 in 42,000 to 1 in 
420,000 chance of transmission during surgery); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 
1265-66 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a “minimal but . . . ascertainable” risk of transmission invoked 
the direct threat exception); Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“While the risk is small, it is not so low as to nullify the catastrophic 
consequences of an accident.”).  
 99. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 450. See also Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove a significant risk of transmission); Chalk v. 
United States Dist. Ct. Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that “there is 
no evidence of any significant risk to children or others at the school . . . [and] [t]o allow the court to 
base its decision on the fear and apprehension of others would frustrate the goals of section 504 [of the 
Rehabilitation Act]”). In Bragdon v. Abbott, the petitioner claimed that  
the use of high-speed drills and surface cooling with water created a risk of airborne HIV 
transmission . . . . [But the petitioner’s] expert witness conceded . . . that no evidence suggested 
the spray could transmit HIV. His opinion on airborne risk was based on the absence of contrary 
evidence, not on positive data. Scientific evidence and expert testimony must have a traceable, 
analytical basis in objective fact before it may be considered on summary judgment. 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 653 (1998) (citation omitted). 
 100. No doubt one of the reasons why the court focused on tender-aged and disabled foster 
children in its counterargument against the generalized CYS policy is the fact that seven of the Doe’s 
adopted children were former foster children. Two of the children were adopted as infants, two had 
disabilities, and “[o]thers had been physically and sexually abused.” Doe III, 242 F.3d at 441. It is 
likely that the court foresaw the placement of similarly tender-aged and disabled foster children into 
the Doe family. See id. at 449 (“The Does have stated a preference for foster children under the age of 
12.”). However, the court cautioned that although it “used tender-aged and disabled foster children to 
illustrate the shortcomings of the County’s policy, [the court’s] holding does not foreclose the 
possibility of placing other foster children with the Does, so long as there is no significant risk.” Id. at 
452. The strict application of the direct threat exception under Doe v. County of Centre does not 
preclude, for example, the assignment of foster children who have other infectious diseases that are not 
transmitted through casual contact. For example, the hepatitis B virus is a serious infectious disease 
that attacks the liver. Like HIV, it is transmitted through tainted blood transfusions, intravenous drug 
use, and sexual contact. ANDREOLI ET AL., supra note 12, at 329-30. 
 101. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 451 (emphasis added). 
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possible, the court found that a reasonable fact finder would deem the 
possibility to be a “remote and speculative risk that is insufficient for a 
finding of significant risk, and insufficient for the invocation of the direct 
threat exception.”102  
The Third Circuit’s rationale necessarily invoked the public policy of 
supporting the state interest in the placement of foster children. The court 
was careful to acknowledge the County’s obligation to protect the safety of 
its charges by exploring existing policy. Although the court failed to find any 
policy that addressed the issue directly, it relied on a prohibition by the 
Philadelphia Department of Human Services barring discrimination against 
foster parents based on actual or perceived HIV/AIDS status.
103
 Through its 
Office of Children and Youth Services, the County operated “under a 
statutory duty to investigate foster parent applicants in order to preserve the 
physical and emotional health of foster children.”104 In light of the negligible 
risk of HIV transmission, the Third Circuit determined that the County’s 
investigation lacked the individualization necessary to avoid the 
discriminatory effect of a general policy.
105
 
The Third Circuit’s balancing of state and individual interests begs the 
question of whether the court’s conclusion is a fair result. Did the court 
sacrifice public welfare for the sake of political correctness? There is ample 
evidence that the court did not overcompensate for societal sensitivity to 
HIV/AIDS by an overly narrow interpretation of the direct threat exception 
to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Instead, the court made the rational 
determination that within the facts of Doe v. County of Centre, public welfare 
would not be endangered and was hardly implicated, given the private nature 
of the insignificant risk presented.  
 
 
 102. Id. at 450. 
 103. Id. at 444 (citing CHILDREN & YOUTH DIV., PHILA. DEP’T HUM. SERVICES, POLICY MANUAL 
§§ 1010, 5200 (“The Department . . . does not discriminate in . . . its recruitment or development of 
kinship caregivers, foster parents, adoptive parents, and contracted providers on the basis of . . . [their] 
living or [being] perceived as living with HIV/AIDS.”)). 
 104. Doe III, 242 F.3d at 443. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6344(d)(2) (1991 & Supp. 2001) 
(requiring foster family care agencies to require prospective foster parents to submit information 
relating to criminal history and child abuse). See also, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.14.100 (Michie 2000); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-8 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623 (Michie 2001); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5 
(2000), amended by Act of July 25, 2001, 2001 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 92-154 (West); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 52-2-603 (2001); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (Consol. 1994 & Supp. 2001); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 50-06-05.1 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.03 (Anderson 2000); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
62, § 2175 (West 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-590 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000). See generally Abigail 
English, The HIV-AIDS Epidemic and the Child Welfare System: Protecting the Rights of Infants, 
Young Children, and Adolescents, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (1992) (examining the obligations of child 
welfare agencies in the context of HIV/AIDS). 
 105. See, e.g., Doe III, 242 F.3d at 451.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit’s narrow, individualized application of the direct threat 
exception to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act furthers the efforts of previous 
courts to eliminate the remaining vestiges of society’s bias against HIV-
positive individuals and irrational fear of contagion.
106
 Individualized 
inquiries enable courts to strike a fair balance between a series of competing 
interests. In Doe v. County of Centre, the Third Circuit managed to balance 
the State’s interest in protecting foster children, the interest of disabled 
individuals vulnerable to discriminatory procedure, and society’s interest in 
public health and safety. As a body of specifics, law is a collaboration of 
theories culminating into policy. Courts cannot afford to abandon their 
gatekeeper role because, as this case demonstrates, constant scrutiny acts as a 
countermeasure against the discriminatory effects of errant public policy. 
Annie O. Wu
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 106. See Circuit Court Addresses Direct Threat Issue, Reverses HIV Foster Care Ban, DISABILITY 
COMPLIANCE BULL., Mar. 23, 2001 (“The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund Ind., which 
filed an amicus brief on behalf of 13 AIDS, public health and child advocacy groups, said that the 
ruling ‘advances science and rationality over fears about HIV.’”). 
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